Why did the industry shift to OIS discounting for collateralized derivatives, and how does it differ from LIBOR discounting?
I've read that after the 2008 crisis, dealers stopped using LIBOR as the discount rate for collateralized swaps and switched to OIS. But I don't fully understand why. If a swap is collateralized, why does the discount rate change? And what happens to the valuation of existing swaps when you switch curves?
The shift to OIS (Overnight Index Swap) discounting reflects a fundamental reassessment of the risk-free rate and the economics of collateral. Before 2008, LIBOR was treated as virtually risk-free, but the crisis exposed significant credit risk embedded in interbank lending rates.\n\nThe Core Argument:\n\nWhen a derivative is collateralized under a Credit Support Annex (CSA), the collateral earns the overnight rate (Fed Funds, EONIA, or now SOFR/ESTR). The cost of funding the collateral is therefore the overnight rate, not LIBOR. Discounting at LIBOR would overstate the present value because LIBOR includes a term bank credit spread that doesn't apply to overnight-funded collateral.\n\n`mermaid\ngraph LR\n A[\"Pre-Crisis
Single LIBOR curve\"] --> B[\"LIBOR for forecasting
LIBOR for discounting\"]\n C[\"Post-Crisis
Dual-curve framework\"] --> D[\"IBOR/RFR for forecasting
OIS for discounting\"]\n B --> E[\"Assumed: LIBOR ~ risk-free\"]\n D --> F[\"Reality: OIS ~ funding cost of collateral\"]\n E -->|\"Crisis exposed\"| G[\"LIBOR-OIS spread blew out
to 365 bps in Oct 2008\"]\n G --> F\n`\n\nValuation Impact:\n\nConsider Waverly Partners holding a 5-year receiver swap with a $50 million notional and a fixed rate of 3.80%. Under LIBOR discounting (assume LIBOR = 4.10%), the PV of fixed payments uses LIBOR-derived discount factors. Under OIS discounting (OIS = 3.75%), discount factors are higher (lower rate means less discounting), increasing the PV of fixed cash flows.\n\nFixed leg annuity (LIBOR): 4.3721\nFixed leg annuity (OIS): 4.4294\n\nDifference per $1 notional: 0.0573\nOn $50M notional at 3.80% coupon: 50,000,000 x 0.038 x 0.0573 = $108,870 valuation difference.\n\nThis is not a trivial rounding error -- it represents real economic value.\n\nPractical Consequences:\n- Collateralized and uncollateralized swaps now have different valuations for the same cash flows\n- The LIBOR-OIS spread became a key risk indicator (credit stress gauge)\n- CSA terms (eligible collateral currency, rehypothecation rights) directly affect which OIS curve to use\n- Multi-currency CSAs require cheapest-to-deliver collateral optionality modeling\n\nCurrent State (Post-LIBOR Transition):\nWith LIBOR cessation, the dual-curve framework has evolved. USD swaps reference SOFR for both forecasting and discounting, simplifying back toward a single-curve framework -- but the principle of discounting at the collateral funding rate remains foundational.\n\nDive deeper into OIS discounting mechanics in our FRM Valuation and Risk Models course.
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